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 The issue of humanitarian intervention has proven a vexing one of the political left 
during the post-Cold War era. In light mass violence in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Darfur, Libya, and Syria, many leftists abandoned their traditional opposition to militarism 
and argued for robust military intervention by the United States and its allies to alleviate these 
crises. Critics argued in response that interventionism would end up worsening the very crises 
it was supposed to resolve. These issues were recently debated at the Oxford Union Society at 
Oxford University on March 4, 2019. The participants were Michael Chertoff -- former 
Secretary of Homeland Security during the presidency of George W. Bush and coauthor of the 
USA Patriot Act – who presented a qualified defense of humanitarian intervention; and myself, 
who argued against the practice.  
 
In past years, when I debated this issue, I was struck by the sense of almost religious 
zeal that characterized advocacy for interventionism. “We have to do something!” was the 
standard refrain. Those who offered criticisms – including myself -- were cast as amoral 
heretics. However, the repeated failures of interventionism that I note below have taken their 
toll and have served to moderate the tone. During the Oxford debate, I noted a remarkable 
absence of emotionalism. I came away from the event sensing that, while some still defend 
humanitarian intervention, their arguments lack the crusading tone that was so noteworthy in 
the past. I sense that public support for interventionism is beginning to ebb. 
  
What follows is a verbatim transcript of the full statements by myself and Mr. Chertoff, 
as well as our responses to questions posed by the moderator and a member of the audience. 
For reasons of brevity, I have omitted most of the audience questions, as well as the responses. 
Interested readers can find the full debate at the Oxford Union’s Youtube site. 
  
 
Daniel Wilkinson, Oxford Union President 
So, gentlemen, the motion is: “This house believes humanitarian intervention is a contradiction 
in terms.” And Professor Gibbs, your ten-minute opening argument can begin when you’re 
ready. 
  
Professor David Gibbs 
Thank You. Well, I think that when one looks at humanitarian intervention, one has to look at 
the record of what has actually happened and in particular the last three major interventions 
since 2000: The Iraqi intervention of 2003, the Afghanistan intervention of 2001, and the Libya 
intervention of 2011. And what all three of these have in common, is that all three were 
justified at least in part on humanitarian grounds. I mean, the first two partly, the third almost 
exclusively were justified on humanitarian grounds. And all three produced humanitarian 
disasters. This is really quite clear, I think to anybody who has been reading the newspaper 
that these interventions have not gone well at all. And when evaluating the larger issue of 
humanitarian intervention, one really has to first look at those basic facts, which are not 
pleasant. Let me add that it’s very surprising to me in a lot of ways that the whole concept 
humanitarian intervention wasn't just fully discredited by those experiences, but it is not.  
  
We still have calls for other interventions, including in Syria, most notably. Also, there are 
frequent calls for regime change, essentially intervention, in North Korea. I really don't know 
what is going to happen in the future with North Korea. But if the United States does undertake 
regime change in North Korea, I will hazard two predictions: One, it almost certainly will be 
justified at least in part as a humanitarian intervention designed to liberate the people of North 
Korea from a very unwholesome dictator; and two, it'll produce probably the biggest 
humanitarian disaster since 1945. One of the questions is: Why are we not learning from our 
mistakes?  
  
The scale of the failures in these three previous interventions is in a lot of ways quite 
impressive. With regard to Iraq, it's perhaps the best documented failure, I would say. We have 
the 2006 Lancet study. Epidemiologically looking at excess deaths in Iraq, which at that time 
were estimated at 560,000 excess deaths.(1) This was published in 2006. So, presumably it's 
much higher by now. There have been other estimates, mostly on par with that one. And this 
is something that is problematic. Certainly, things were terrible under Saddam Hussein, that’s 
indisputable, as they were under the Taliban, as they were under Muammar Gaddafi, as they 
currently are under Kim Jong Un in North Korea. And so, we went in and removed from power 
those three figures one by one (or I should say with the Taliban, it was a larger regime, with 
Mullah Omar leading a larger regime), and things promptly got worse. It didn't seem to have 
occurred to policymakers that things could actually get worse, but they did.  
  
Another effect that's worth noting is what I would say is a kind of destabilization of regions. 
This is particularly striking in the case of Libya, which destabilized much of North Africa, 
triggering a secondary civil war in Mali in 2013, which was directly attributable to the 
destabilization of Libya. This required a secondary intervention, by France this time, to combat 
basically the instability arising in that country, again justified at least in part on humanitarian 
grounds.  
  
Certainly, one of the things one can say in terms the effects of humanitarian intervention, is 
that if you have a vested interest in intervention and that is something you are seeking, it's an 
excellent idea because it's the gift that just keeps on giving. It keeps on destabilizing regions, 
producing new humanitarian crises, thus justifying new interventions. That's certainly what 
happened in the case of Libya and then Mali. Now if you're interested in humanitarian effect, 
however the situation does not look so good. It does not look very positive at all.  
  
The very striking thing here is the lack of loss of credibility. I'm very struck by the fact that 
the people who helped to argue for these three interventions -- and by that I don't just mean 
policymakers, but also academics and intellectuals like myself. I myself didn't argue for them, 
but many of my colleagues did. And it's rather remarkable to me that there's no expression of 
regret or acknowledgement they did anything wrong in arguing for these interventions. Nor is 
there effort to learn from our mistakes and to try and avoid interventions in the future. There's 
something very dysfunctional about the character of discussion on this topic, when we fail to 
learn from past mistakes.  
  
A second problem with the issue of humanitarian intervention is what some have called the 
“dirty hands” problem. We are relying on countries and agencies of those countries which do 
not have very good records of humanitarian activity. Let us look at the United States and its 
history of interventionism. If one looks at that, the history of US interventionism, we find the 
United States as an intervening power was a major cause of humanitarian crises in the past. If 
one looks for example at the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, the overthrow of Allende 
in Chile in 1973. And I think the most striking example, a less known one, is Indonesia in 
1965, where the CIA helped engineer a coup and then helped orchestrate a massacre of people 
that led to about 500,000 deaths. It's one of the really great massacres post-1945, yes indeed, 
on the scale of what happened in Rwanda, at least approximately. And that was something 
caused by intervention. And one could also go into the issue of the Vietnam War and look for 
example at the Pentagon Papers, the secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam War, and one does 
not get a sense of the United States as either a gentle power or a particularly humanitarian one. 
And the effects certainly were not humanitarian in any of these cases.  
  
There's a larger issue perhaps of human rights violations by the agencies of state that are 
involved in intervention in the United States. We now know from declassified documents that 
both the uniformed military and the CIA were responsible in the 50s and early 60s in 
conducting radiation experiments on unsuspecting individuals; doing things like going around 
and having doctors working for the military injecting people with radioactive isotopes and then 
tracking their bodies over time to see what effects it had and what kinds of illnesses it caused 
them -- without telling them of course. The CIA had very disturbing mind-control experiments, 
testing new interrogation techniques on unsuspecting individuals, with very damaging effects. 
One of the scientists involved in the radiation studies commented in private, again this is from 
a declassified document, that some of what he was doing had what he called the “Buchenwald” 
effect, and we could see what he meant. And the obvious question again is: Why on earth 
would we want to trust agencies that do things like this to do something humanitarian now? 
This is a course long ago. But the fact that we now use the term “humanitarian intervention” 
does not make it a magical phrase and does not magically erase this past history, which is 
relevant and has to be taken into account. I do not want to focus excessively on my own country 
after all. Other states have done other disturbing things. One could look at the history of Britain 
and France, let us say, with the colonial and postcolonial interventions. One does not get a 
picture of humanitarian activity; quite the contrary I would say, either in intent or in effect.  
  
Now I think one of the issues that finally has to be noted is the cost of humanitarian 
intervention. This is something that is rarely taken into account, but perhaps should be taken 
into account, especially since the record of results is so bad in terms of humanitarian effect. 
Well, military action generally speaking is extremely expensive. Amassing division-sized 
forces, deploying them overseas for extended periods of time cannot be done except at extreme 
expense. In the case of the Iraq War, what we have is what has been termed “the three trillion-
dollar war.” Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia and Linda Bilmes estimated in 2008 the long-term 
cost of the Iraq War at $3 trillion.(2) Those figures of course are obsolete, because that's over 
ten years ago, but $3 trillion is quite a lot when you think about it. In fact, it's greater than the 
combined gross domestic product of Great Britain at the present time. And one wonders what 
kind of wonderful humanitarian projects we could have done with $3 trillion, rather than 
wasting it in a war that did nothing but killed several hundred thousand people and destabilized 
a region.  
  
And these wars are not over of course in either Libya, nor Iraq, nor Afghanistan. Afghanistan 
is nearing the end of its second decade of war and the second decade of US intervention. This 
may very well run into being the longest war in US history, if it not already is. It depends how 
you define longest war, but it's certainly getting up there. And one can think of all sorts of 
things that could have been done with some of this money, for example, vaccination of 
children, who are under-vaccinated. (Two minutes is that right? One minute.) One could think 
of people who don't have enough medicines including in my own country the United States, 
where many people go without proper medicines. As economists know, you have opportunity 
costs. If you spend money on one thing, you may not have it available for another. And I think 
what we've been doing is overspending on intervention again with no significant humanitarian 
results or very few that I can discern. I guess I'm very impressed by the medical analogy here 
and the medical emphasis, so that's of course why I titled my book “First Do No Harm.” And 
the reason is that in medicine you don't just go and operate on the patient because the patient 
is suffering. You have to do a proper analysis of whether or not the operation will be positive 
or negative. An operation can of course hurt people, and in medicine sometimes the best thing 
to do is nothing. And perhaps here, the first thing we should do with the humanitarian crises is 
not make them worse, which is what we've done. Thank you. 
  
Wilkinson 
Thank you, Professor. Michael, your ten-minute argument can begin when you’re ready. 
  
Michael Chertoff 
The proposition here is whether humanitarian intervention is a contradiction in terms, and I 
think the answer to that is no. Sometimes it’s ill-advised, sometimes, it's well advised. 
Sometimes it doesn't work, sometimes it does work. It rarely works perfectly, but nothing in 
life does. So, let me first begin by talking about the three examples the professor gave: 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. I'm going to tell you Afghanistan was not a humanitarian 
intervention. Afghanistan was the result of an attack launched on the United States that killed 
3,000 people, and it was quite openly and deliberately an effort to remove the person who 
launched the attack from the ability to do it again. If you think it wasn't worth it, I will tell you 
from personal experience: When we went into Afghanistan, we found laboratories al Qaeda 
was using to experiment with chemical and biological agents on animals, so they could deploy 
those against people in the West. Had we not gone into Afghanistan, we might be inhaling 
those now as we speak. This is not humanitarian in the sense of altruistic. This is kind of basic, 
core security that every country owes its citizens.  
  
Iraq is also I think in my view not principally a humanitarian intervention. We can debate in a 
different debate what happened with the intelligence, and whether it was totally wrong or only 
partially wrong, regarding the possibility of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But at least 
that was the major assumption going in. It may have been erroneous, and there are all kinds of 
arguments that the way in which it was executed was poorly done. But again, it was not 
humanitarian. Libya was a humanitarian intervention. And the problem with Libya is I think 
the second part of what I want to say, which is not all humanitarian interventions are good. 
And in order to make a decision to intervene, you have to take into account some very 
important elements of what you're facing. What is your strategy and your objective, do you 
have clarity about that? What is your awareness of what the conditions in the place you're 
intervening in actually are? What are your capabilities and your willingness to be committed 
to see things through to the end? And then, to what degree do you have support from the 
international community? Libya is an example of a case where, while the impulse may have 
been humanitarian, these things were not carefully thought-out. And if I can say so, Michael 
Hayden and I made this point in an op-ed shortly after this process began.(3) That the easy part 
was going to be removing Gaddafi. The hard part was going to be what happens after Gaddafi 
is removed. And so here I agree with the professor. Had someone looked at the four factors I 
mentioned, they would have said: “Well you know, we don't really know, we haven’t really 
though through what happens without Gaddafi?” What happens to all the extremists in prison? 
What happens to all the mercenaries that he's paid for, who now aren't getting paid anymore? 
And that led to some of the negative results. I also think there was a failure to understand that 
when you remove a dictator, you have an unstable situation. And as Colin Powell used to say, 
if you broke it you bought it. If you're going to remove a dictator, you've got to then be prepared 
to invest in stabilizing. If you're not prepared to make that investment, you have no business 
removing him.  
  
By way of example on the other side, if you look at for example the interventions in Sierra 
Leone and Ivory Coast. Sierra Leone was 2000. There was the United Front that was advancing 
on the capital. The British came in, they repelled them. They drove them back. And because 
of that, Sierra Leone was able to stabilize, and they ultimately wound up having elections. Or 
Ivory Coast, you had an incumbent who refused to accept that he had lost an election. He began 
to use violence against his people. There was an intervention. He was ultimately arrested, and 
now Ivory Coast has a democracy. So again, there are ways to do humanitarian intervention 
that can be successful, but not if you don't pay attention to the four characteristics I talked 
about.  
  
Now, let me give you an example from something that we are literally facing today, and that 
is what is going on in Syria. And let's ask the question whether a couple of years ago, before 
the Russians got deeply involved, before the Iranians got deeply involved, whether an 
intervention would have made a difference in saving literally tens of thousands of people from 
being killed, innocent civilians with bombs and chemical weapons, as well as a huge mass 
migration crisis. And I think the answer is: Had we done in Syria what we did in northern Iraq 
in 1991, established a no-fly zone and a no-go zone for Assad and his people, and if we had 
done it early, we might have averted what we now see unfolding and continuing to unfold in 
the region. So, now I'm going to now look at it from the other lens: What happens when you 
don't intervene, as I suggest that we might have done in Syria? Well not only do you have a 
humanitarian crisis, you have a security crisis. Because as the consequence of not really 
enforcing any of the rules I've talked about and notwithstanding the fact that President Obama 
said there was a red line about chemical weapons and then the line disappeared when the 
chemical weapons were used. Because of the fact that we didn't enforce these humanitarian 
measures, we had not only many deaths, but we literally had an upheaval that has now reached 
into the heart of Europe. The reason the EU is now having a crisis about migration is because, 
and perhaps with some intent, the Russians as well as the Syrians deliberately acted to drive 
civilians out of the country and force them to go elsewhere. Many of them are now in Jordan 
and putting a strain on Jordan, but many of them are trying to get into Europe. And I have little 
doubt that Putin understood or quickly recognized, even if it was not his original intent, that 
once you create a migration crisis, you are creating a disorder and dissension within your 
principal adversary, which is Europe. And that has a destabilizing effect, the consequences of 
which we continue to see today.  
  
And so, one of the things I want to say to be honest, is when we talk about humanitarian 
intervention, there is often an altruistic dimension to it, but frankly there is also a self-interested 
dimension. Places of disorder are places where terrorists operate, and you've seen Isis until 
quite recently had territory in parts of Syria and parts of Iraq that were not properly governed. 
It creates migration crises and similar crises, which then have an impact on the stability and 
the good order of the rest of the world. And it also creates grievances and desires for payback 
that often result in cycles of violence that continue over and over again, and you see that in 
Rwanda.  
  
So, my bottom line is this: Not all humanitarian interventions are warranted, not all 
humanitarian interventions are properly thought out and properly executed. But by the same 
token, not all of them are wrong or improperly executed. And again, I go back to 1991 and the 
no-fly zone and no-go zone in Kurdistan as an example of one that worked. The key is this: Be 
clear why you're going in; don't underestimate the cost of what you're undertaking; have the 
capabilities and the commitment to see that you can handle those costs and achieve the result 
that you set out for yourself. Make sure you are aware of the conditions on the ground, so you 
make a rational assessment. And finally get international support, don't go it alone. I think in 
those circumstances, humanitarian intervention can not only be successful, but it can save a lot 
of lives and make our world more secure. Thank you. 
  
Question (Wilkinson) 
Thank you, Michael. Thank you both for those introductory remarks. I’ll ask one question, and 
then we’ll move over to questions from the audience. My question is this: You both cited a 
number of historical examples. But would you say it is a fair assessment that practically the 
problem is that there can never be a sufficient long-term plan, sufficient well intentions, 
sufficient benevolent motivations, or a sufficient harm-analysis to counter the fact that 
individual organizations and international organizations are fallible. And they will always 
make mistakes. And the fallibility of those groups means that humanitarian intervention has to 
be a contradiction in terms. So, Michael, if you’d like to respond.  
  
Answer (Chertoff) 
My answer is this: Inaction is action. Some people think if you don't do something that's 
somehow abstaining. But if you don't do something, something is going to happen. So, if for 
example Franklin Roosevelt had decided not to help the British in 1940 with Lend Lease, 
because “I don't know if I'm making a mistake or not,” that would have resulted in a different 
outcome with respect to World War II. I don't think we'd be saying “well but that was inaction, 
so it didn't matter.” I think inaction is a form of action. And every time you're presented with 
a choice, you have to balance the consequences as far as you can project them, from both doing 
something and abstaining from doing something.  
  
Answer (Gibbs) 
Well, I think that of course inaction is a form of action, but the onus should always be on 
person advocating intervention. Because let's be very clear on this: Intervention is an act of 
war. Humanitarian intervention is a mere euphemism. When we advocate humanitarian 
intervention, we are advocating war. The movement for intervention is a movement for war. 
And it seems to me those who advocate against war really have no burden on them of proof. 
The burden of proof should be on those who advocate for the use of violence, and really the 
standards should be very high for the use of violence. And I think we can see it's been used 
quite frivolously in the past to an extraordinary degree.  
  
And a basic problem you have in small interventions -- for example the 1991 no-fly zone over 
Iraq -- is these things take place in the real world, not in a pretend world. And in that real 
world, the United States considers itself a great power, and there'll always be the question of 
American credibility. And if the U.S. undertakes half measures, such as a no-fly zone, there 
will always be pressures on the United States from various factions in the foreign policy 
establishment to take a more maximalist effort and solve the problem once and for all. Hence 
the need for another war with Iraq in 2003, producing an utter catastrophe. I get very queasy 
when I hear people discussing “let us just do a limited intervention, it'll just stop at that,” 
because it usually doesn't stop at that. There's the quagmire effect. You step into the quagmire, 
and you get deeper and deeper into the quagmire. And there will always be those who advocate 
deeper and deeper intervention. 
  
I guess one more point: I did want to respond to the claim which is a frequent one that the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars were not really humanitarian interventions. It is true that this was 
to some extent, both interventions were at least partly traditional national interest, realpolitik, 
and the like. But if you look back at the record, clearly both were justified in part as 
humanitarian interventions, both by the Bush administration as well as many academics. I 
have here before me an edited volume published by the University of California Press, and I 
believe it's 2005, called A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in 
Iraq.”(4) Just do a Google search on “humanitarian arguments for war in Iraq,” and this was 
very much part of the picture.  I think it's a bit of a rewriting of history to say that 
humanitarian intervention was not a significant factor in the arguments for war in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. They were very much part of both those wars.  And I would say the results very 
much discredit the idea of humanitarian intervention. 
  
Question (Audience) 
Thanks, so you've both talked about some historical examples and I'd like to hear both of your 
perspectives about the ongoing situation in Venezuela. And the Trump administration and the 
plans and the reports have come out that they might have plans to use military force there and 
how you would evaluate that in light of both of the perspectives that you've shared. 
  
Answer (Chertoff) 
So, I think what's happening in Venezuela is first of all I mean there's obviously a political 
dictatorship. And as I've said I don't think political regime issues are a reason to intervene 
militarily. There is also a humanitarian element here. People are starving. But I don't know 
we’re at the level of humanitarian crisis that we've seen in other cases. So, my short answer 
would be: I don't think we've met the threshold for having a real discussion about humanitarian 
intervention in a military sense.  
  
That's not to say there aren't non-military ways to intervene, just to be clear so we round the 
picture out. There are a lot of tools in the toolbox when you deal with intervention. There are 
sanctions, economic sanctions. There is even potential use of cyber tools as a way of having 
some impact on what's going on. There is the possibility in some instances of legal action, for 
example International Criminal Court or something. So, all of these ought to be considered 
part of the toolbox. If I was looking at Venezuela, assuming it did, which I emphasize it has 
not, reach the level of humanitarian intervention, you would then have to balance issues like: 
Is there an endgame we see or a strategy we see to be successful? Do we have the capabilities 
to achieve it? Do we have international support? I think all of those would probably militate 
against it. That's not to say it couldn't change, but the dimensions of this I don't think have 
reached the point where military action is reasonable or likely. 
  
Answer (Gibbs) 
Well, the most important thing you need to know about Venezuela is that it's an undiversified 
oil exporting economy, and there's been a drop in oil price since 2014. I'll certainly grant that 
a lot of what is going on now is the fault of Maduro and authoritarian actions he's been taking, 
as well as mismanagement, corruption, and so on. Most of what has been going on by any 
reasonable reading, by any informed reading, is due to low oil prices.  
  
It points to I think a larger issue, which is the way humanitarian crises are often triggered by 
economic crises. Discussions of Rwanda almost never discuss the fact that the genocide – and 
I think it really was a genocide in the case of Rwanda -- the genocide by the Hutu against the 
Tutsi took place in the context of a major economic crisis resulting from the collapse of coffee 
prices. Again, a very undiversified economy that was reliant almost exclusively on coffee. 
Coffee prices collapse, you get a political crisis. Yugoslavia had a major economic crisis just 
before the country broke up and descended into hell. We know about the descent into hell, 
most people don't know about the economic crisis.  
  
For some reason people find economics boring, and because it's boring and military 
intervention seems more exciting, we think that the solution is to send in the 82nd Airborne 
Division. Whereas perhaps it would have been simpler and a lot cheaper and easier and better 
from a humanitarian standpoint to address the economic crisis; the very heavy emphasis placed 
on austerity in the international economic system and the very damaging political effects 
austerity has in many countries. Historical context is necessary here: For all the constant, 
repetitious references to the Third Reich and to World War II, which we hear again and again 
and again and again, people often forget that one of the things that brought us Adolph Hitler 
was the Great Depression. Any reasonable reading of Weimar Germany's history would be 
that without the Depression, you almost certainly would not have gotten the rise of Nazism. 
So, I think a greater addressing of the economic issues in the case of Venezuela -- Even if the 
United States were to overthrow Maduro by whatever means and replace them with someone 
else,  that someone else would still have to deal with the issue of low oil prices and the 
damaging effects on the economy, which would remain unaddressed by humanitarian 
intervention, whether we call it that or something else.  
  
I guess another point about the United States and Venezuela is that the United Nations sent a 
representative down there and condemned the US sanctions as greatly intensifying the 
humanitarian crisis. So, the intervention the United States has been doing -- economic at this 
point mostly, rather than military -- is making things worse, and that clearly has to stop. If 
we're interested in helping the people of Venezuela, surely the United States would not want 
to make it worse. 
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